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The judgment of Leggatt J in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation 
Ltd shows the common belief that the English law of contract does not have a doctrine 
of good faith to be mistaken. That law does not have a general principle of good faith, 
but its doctrine of good faith, articulated through numerous specific duties, is more 
suitable for the interpretation of contracts according to the intentions of the parties 
than a general principle, which invites the imposition of exogenous standards. That 
Yam Seng involved a relational contract does not mean that paternalistic exogenous 
standards should be imposed. It means that the good faith obligations essential even to 
a commercial contract of this sort must be implied in order to give efficacy to the 
fundamentally co-operative relationship analytically essential to all contracts. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd1 maps out a direction for the 
development of a doctrine good faith in the English law of contract which, it is 
submitted, should be followed. Leggatt J’s judgment has quickly attracted 
considerable attention2 largely because the prospect of a harmonised European law of 
                                                                                                                                            
* Lancaster University School of Law. I am grateful to Jay Feinman, Catherine 
Mitchell, Adrian Salter and an anonymous referee for their comments. 
1 [2013] EWHC 111 (QB). Judgment was handed down on 1 February 2013. 
Unattributed paragraph numbers in the footnotes are references to this case. 
 As of 6 March 2014, Yam Seng had been considered in Hamsard 3147 Limited 
Trading as ‘Mini Mode Childrenswear’, J S Childrenswear Limited (in liquidation) v 
Boots UK Ltd [EWHC] 3251 (Pat); in Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust v 
Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd (t/a Medirest) [2013] EWCA Civ 200, [2013] 
BLR 265 (it could have no influence on the first instance judgment of Cranston J in 
Mid Essex ([2012] EWHC 781 (QB)), which preceded Yam Seng by some 11 months) 
and in TSG Building Services plc v South Anglia Housing Ltd [2013] EWHC 1151 
(TCC). It had been cited without discussion in a number of other cases. 
2 As of 6 March 2014, this Queen’s Bench judgment had been reported no less than 
five times, [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 1321, [2013] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 526, [2013] BLR 
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contract gives impetus to the resolution of the perceived conflict between the absence 
of good faith in the English law and its presence in civilian laws. A number of 
European and international expressions of a general doctrine of good faith3 are now 
hailed as potential remedies for an absence which has long been identified as ‘at once 
the most remarkable and the most reprehensible feature of the English law of 
contract’.4 
 Yam Seng will frustrate those who see the issues this way. It shows that the 
English law recognises specific duties which do the useful part of the work of good 
faith and that there is no need for a general doctrine. It also gives weight to the 
argument that the English law should recognise the ‘relational’ contract as part of its 
understanding of good faith. It does all this whilst, unlike a number of other 
significant judgments of recent vintage, actually striving to reach the right decision 
about liability on the facts. 
 
OPTIMISM AND OPPORTUNISM IN CONTRACTUAL NEGOTIATION 
Following negotiations between Yam Seng Pte Ltd (YSL) and International Trade 
Corporation Ltd (ITC) begun on 23 January 2009, on 12 May 2009 ITC granted YSL 
the exclusive right to distribute certain cosmetics under the brand name of Manchester 
United, ITC maintaining that it had a licence ‘to manufacture and sell Manchester 
                                                                                                                                            
147, [2013] 1 CLC 662 and (2013) 146 Con LR 39, and digested in [2013] All ER (D) 
227 and [2013] Bus LR D53. 
3 Principally the draft Common Frame of Reference: C. von Bar et al (eds), 
Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (Outline Edition) (Munich, Germany: Sellier, 2009) bk III, 1:103. 
4 R.M. Goode, Commercial Law (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, rev edn, 1985) 
117. This criticism has been retained in E. McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law 
(London: Pengun Books, 4th edn, 2010) 125. See also n 42 below. 
3 
 
United fragrances’.5 A warm business relationship cooled largely because ITC 
repeatedly failed to supply merchandise as agreed, so that YSL itself repeatedly made 
commitments to retailers that it could not meet, and because ITC’s explanations of its 
failures and assurances of improved performance justifiably came to be regarded as 
implausible or outright false.6 YSL eventually terminated the agreement, and sued for 
breach of contract or, in the alternative, misrepresentation. 
 At the hearing, the only two witnesses of fact were the ‘controllers’ of the 
companies, who had written the contract without benefit of legal advice, and 
personally conducted the business relationship, Mr Sunil Tuli of YSL and Mr Roy 
Presswell of ITC. Whilst Mr Tuli was a credible witness, Mr Presswell was quite the 
other thing, and Leggatt J was unable ‘to attach any credence to his testimony’.7 Proof 
of fraud is, of course, not necessary for proof of breach. It is also settled law8 that 
fraud is and should be difficult to prove in relationship to misrepresentation, and YSL 
did not base its misrepresentation claim on fraud but on the catch-all of the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 s 2(1). Leggatt J did not find Mr Presswell to have been 
deceitful, even when his testimony about his conduct was blatantly contradicted by 
documentary evidence and when there may have been a strong motive for deceit. 
Rather he found him to be possessed of ‘a striking ability to treat wishful thinking as 
fact’.9 
                                                                                                                                            
5 para [14]. 
6 I will not discuss the actual pricing of the products, though Mr Tuli’s ‘belief that Mr 
Presswell had lied to him on this commercially important issue was a breaking point 
in the relationship’: para [73]. 
7 para [9]. 
8 Going back at least to Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 (HL).  
9 para [16]. 
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 Though we shall return to this finding,10 one example of Mr Presswell’s conduct 
will convey the merits of the dispute. At the very outset, Mr Presswell claimed that 
ITC had ‘recently signed’ the licence ‘to manufacture and sell Manchester United 
fragrances’. But ITC was then merely in negotiation over this licence, which was 
granted, and then only in part, on 5 May,11 ie almost 4 months after the start of the 
negotiations and only a week before the agreement with YSL, Leggatt J concluded 
that Mr Presswell ‘undoubtedly’ made ‘a false statement’ about this crucial issue.12 
But Mr Presswell would not, even under cross-examination by counsel armed with 
conclusive documentary evidence, admit this, and Leggatt J regarded this as 
‘symptomatic’ of Mr Presswell’s powers of self-deception.13 
 Leggatt J found that ITC seriously breached its obligations to supply certain 
merchandise, and that some of Mr Presswell’s communications as the relationship 
deteriorated amounted to a repudiation allowing YSL to terminate. Fullest 
consideration was given to the damages consequent upon this finding, and the parties 
were invited to agree quantum. 
 This judgment has attracted such attention because of the way Leggatt J dealt 
with YSL’s pleading that ITC breached an ‘implied term … that the parties would 
deal with each other in good faith’.14 Before turning to this, however, it is necessary 
to consider a subsidiary but vital part of Leggatt J’s judgment: his belief that Yam 
Seng involved a relational contract.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
10 See the text accompanying n 91 below. 
11 para [27]. 
12 para [16]. 
13 para [17]. 
14 para [119]. 
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YAM SENG AS A RELATIONAL CONTRACT 
Leggatt J described the parties’ agreement as ‘a distributorship agreement which 
required the parties to communicate effectively and co-operate with each other in its 
performance’,15 and as such regarded it as a ‘relational’ contract: 
English law has traditionally drawn a sharp distinction between certain 
relationships – such as partnership, trusteeship and other fiduciary 
relationships – on the one hand, in which the parties owe onerous 
obligations of disclosure to each other, and other contractual relationships 
in which no duty of disclosure is supposed to operate. Arguably at least, 
that dichotomy is too simplistic. While it seems unlikely that any duty to 
disclose information in performance of the contract would be implied 
where the contract involves a simple exchange, many contracts do not fit 
this model and involve a longer term relationship between the parties 
which they make a substantial commitment. Such “relational” contracts, 
as they are sometimes called, may require a high degree of 
communication, co-operation and predictable performance based on 
mutual trust and confidence and involve expectations of loyalty which are 
not legislated for in the express terms of the contract but are implicit in the 
parties’ understanding and necessary to give business efficacy to the 
arrangements. Examples of such relational contracts might include some 
joint venture agreements, franchise agreements and long term 
distributorship agreements.16 
 This recognition of relational contracts is, of course, at complete variance with 
Baird Textile Holdings plc v Marks and Spencer plc,17 which expressed the position 
authoritatively set out by Professor McKendrick that ‘English law would not be 
                                                                                                                                            
15 para [143]. 
16 para [142]. 
17 [2001] EWCA Civ 274, [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 737 (CA) at para [16] per Sir 
Andrew Morritt VC. See also Total Gas Marketing Ltd v Arco British Ltd [1998] 2 
Lloyds Rep 209 (HL) at 218 per Lord Steyn. 
 How Baird should have been handled in light of the relational theory has been 
the subject of a number of interesting papers: S. Mouzas and D. Ford, ‘Managing 
Relationships in Showery Weather: The Role of Umbrella Agreements’ (2006) 59 
Journal of Business Research 1248; L. Mulcahy and C. Andrews, ‘Baird Textile 
Holdings v Marks and Spencer plc’ in R. Hunter et al (eds), Feminist Judgments 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) and J. Morgan, ‘In Defence of Baird Textiles’ in D. 
Campbell et al (eds), Changing Concepts of Contract (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013). See also C. Mitchell, ‘Narrativising Contract Law’ (2009) 29 
Legal Studies 19. 
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justified in taking the step of recognising the existence of a formal category of 
relational contracts’.18  
 But, with respect, that this step should be taken is so obvious that the failure to 
do so is the principal cause of discontent in the current teaching of contract, where 
this failure is recognised by the better students as they struggle with Williams v Roffey 
Bros and Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd.19 Why was the additional payment to the 
subcontractor enforceable, and how can this case be distinguished from Stilk v 
Myrick?20 Surely the claimant seaman’s performance conveyed as much ‘practical 
benefit’ to the captain as did the subcontractor’s to the contractor. Regarding some 
practical benefits as insufficient is the point of the doctrine of existing obligations. As 
the better students comprehend, and as other students viscerally feel, these cases 
cannot logically be distinguished on the ground of practical benefit. And if practical 
benefit is logical nonsense, then so equally21 is promissory estoppel, regardless of 
whether it is confined as it was intended it should be in Central London Property 
Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd,22 or whether it is an alternative general form of 
liability.23  
                                                                                                                                            
18 E. McKendrick, ‘Long-term Contracts in English Law’ in J. Beatson and D. 
Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in English Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995) 323.  
19 [1991] 1 QB 1 (CA). 
20 (1809) 170 ER 1168. This is Campbell’s report of the case. Espinasse’s report, 
(1809) 170 ER 851, notoriously does not bring out the relationship of policy to the 
consideration argument at all. 
21 ‘Equally’ is not strong enough in light of the Court of Appeal’s categorical refusal 
in Re Selectmove Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 315 (CA) at 479H to recognise the ‘beneficial’ 
nature of accord and satisfaction spelt out in terms by Lord Blackburn in Foakes v 
Beer itself: (1884) 9 App Cas 605 (HL) at 622. This refusal was dictated by precedent 
if Foakes v Beer was to continue to have ‘any application’: Selectmove, loc cit, 481B.  
22 [1947] KB 130. 
23 Baird Textiles, n 17 above, paras [32]–[40], [49]–[55], [78]–[98] confirmed the 
shield not a sword aspect of the English doctrine of estoppel, though Judge LJ 
disapproved of this ‘misleading aphorism’ (ibid, para [52]), and the court (ibid, para 
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 The only ground on which Stilk v Myrick and Williams v Roffey can be 
coherently distinguished is that they were contracts of two different types calling for 
different treatments. Though the seamen’s obligation had an important element of 
flexibility derived from what would now be called the implied term of mutual trust 
and confidence in an employment contract, that obligation could be fixed within a 
reasonable compass at the time of the agreement, and it was very important that it 
should remain fixed over the course of performance. The essence of the agreement 
was that the seamen had to adjust their performance to accommodate the risks of the 
voyage. 
 The subcontractor’s obligation could not be fixed in this way. Despite the 
criticisms that can be made of the claimant in Williams v Roffey, it is remarkable that 
the defendant took its case so far as the Court of Appeal. This not only involved a 
general challenge to the central feature of construction contracts of any complexity, 
which is that they do not agree price but leave an estimate open to modification. It 
also involved a particular challenge to the consequent accepted wisdom of 
construction contract practice that ‘a main contractor who agrees too low a price with 
a subcontractor is acting contrary to his own interests. He will never get the job 
finished without paying more money’.24 It certainly is the case that this essential 
construction law aspect of the ‘factual matrix’25 which influenced the court’s finding 
about ‘the true intention of the parties’26 is not adequately discussed, but that the 
finding about consideration was tailored to reflect that true intention rather than the 
                                                                                                                                            
[98]) held open the possibility of adopting something like the Australian position 
under Waltons Stores (Interstate) v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 (HCA). 
24 Williams v Roffey, n 17 above, 10G. The judgment of Mr R Jackson QC in the 
Country Court which Glidewell LJ quotes at this point is extremely insightful. 
25 ibid, 19F. 
26 ibid, 18H. 
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intention actually being subject to the requirement of consideration is unarguable 
outside the courtroom. 
 In his influential 1997 paper on reasonable expectations, Lord Steyn told us that 
in Williams v Roffey: ‘[t]he reasonable expectations of the parties prevailed over 
technical and conceptualistic reasoning’ because ‘[t]he court was obviously concerned 
that the doctrine of consideration should not restrict the ability of commercial 
contractors to make periodic consensual modifications, and even one-sided 
modifications, as the work under a construction contract proceeded’.27 But Lord Steyn 
was unable to tell us why such expectations of modification were reasonable in that 
case but not in most others. The problem is that the doctrine of existing obligations 
cannot draw the necessary distinction. In Stilk v Myrick, the finding of insufficiency 
gave effect to the policy of limiting seamen’s power to force a renegotiation of their 
wages, and enforcing a limit of this sort is exactly what the doctrine of existing 
obligations rightly does. But it does so indiscriminately, and, whilst this is correct for 
the majority of situations, it is wholly inappropriate to situations, such as part 
payment of debt in full satisfaction as in High Trees or flexible pricing as in Williams 
v Roffey, which turn on the legitimate modification of an existing obligation. A 
treatment of the doctrine of existing obligations which can make some sense of these 
perfectly common contractual situations, even to the tortured undergraduate,28 is 
emerging in this country.29 But no true coherence will be achieved until we are able to 
                                                                                                                                            
27 J. Steyn, ‘Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men’ 
(1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 433, 437-8. On the issues of concern to us here see 
J. Steyn, ‘The Role of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Contract Law: A Hair Shirt 
Philosophy’ [1991] Denning Law Journal 131. 
28 R. Halson, Contract Law (Harlow: Pearson, 2nd edn, 2013) ch 12. 
29 R. Halson, ‘Sailors, Sub-contractors and Consideration’ (1990) 106 Law Quarterly 
Review 183 and R. Halson, ‘Opportunism, Economic Duress and Contractual 
Modifications’ (1991) 107 Law Quarterly Review 649. 
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distinguish in a principled fashion between contracts the terms of which can be fixed 
at the time of agreement and contracts the terms of which cannot be fixed in this way. 
 The necessary distinction is the basis of what in most of his work the late Ian 
Macneil called the ‘relational’ contract.30 In a relatively simple contract, the sort 
Macneil typically called a discrete contract, exemplified for him by a spot cash sale of 
a bulk generic good,31 risks are allocated between the parties by ‘presentiation’.32 It 
would seem that this ugly term, which has never caught on, has handicapped the 
understanding of this part of Macneil’s thinking, which is the basis of the meaning of 
the relational contract in the sense I am now using the term. Presentiation is the 
technique of identifying risks of non-performance and allocating them to the parties at 
the time of the agreement. In a discrete contract, the great majority of risks may be 
regarded as having been present in the minds of the parties at that time. 33  
In contrast, in a relational contract, exemplified for Macneil by a complex, 
long-term contract to supply coal to a smelter,34 presentiation is of limited use. The 
presence of large transaction costs, such as the costs of gathering information about 
risks that will markedly shift over the term of the contract, means that the parties must 
negotiate with highly bounded rationality. They cannot, therefore, agree what to do 
about those risks at the time of agreement, and so may have to leave essentially open 
                                                                                                                                            
30 I have edited a collection of Macneil’s works which I believe is the most 
convenient point of access to those works: I.R. Macneil, The Relational Theory of 
Contract (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2001). 
31 I.R. Macneil. ‘Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the 
Need for a “Rich Classificatory Apparatus”’ (1981) 78 Northwestern University Law 
Review 1018, 1025-6. 
32 I.R. Macneil, ‘Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation’ (1974) 60 
Virginia Law Review 586. 
33 In Stilk v Myrick, Lord Ellenburgh maintained that the seamen had ‘undertaken to 
do all that they could under all the emergencies of the voyage’ ‘[b]efore they sailed 
from London’: Stilk v Myrick, n 20 above, 1161, emphasis added. 
34 Macneil, n 31 above, 1025-6. 
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even terms which constitute the core of the contract. Such an agreement should be 
enforced, but so also should legitimate modifications of it, and the test of legitimacy is 
whether the modification is of a risk which could or could not be presentiated.35 
Macneil has provided an exhaustive analysis of the ‘contract planning’ which 
places all such provisions for flexibility within a single, theoretically coherent 
framework.36 It is not a doctrinally coherent framework, for the positive law of 
contract based on the doctrine of existing obligations does not properly understand the 
issues and does not allow of such coherence. Macneil looked forward to the relational 
theory eliminating the ‘unnecessarily abrasive manner’ in which the classical law 
rubbed ‘against the realities of coexistence with relational needs for flexibility and 
change’ because that law was ‘founded on the assumption that all of a contractual 
relation is founded in some original assent to it, where that assumption manifestly is 
false’.37 
 In my opinion, Yam Seng involved a significantly, but not pronouncedly, 
relational contract. Only two of ITC’s obligations were pronouncedly relational in the 
sense I have so far used the term. ITC had an obligation to supply merchandise in 
quantities YSL required,38 and the agreement envisaged an extension, which was 
                                                                                                                                            
35 I have tried to show the limitations of the concept of ‘foreseeability’, as opposed to 
presentiation, in framing this test in D. Campbell, ‘The Law of Force Majeure and the 
Planning of Long-term Contracts’ in K. Dharmananga and L. Firios (eds), Long-term 
Contracts (Annandale, Australia: Federation Press, 2013).  
36 I.R. Macneil, ‘A Primer of Contract Planning’ (1975) 48 Southern California Law 
Review 627. This paper forms the framework for the second part of Macneil’s second 
casebook: I.R. Macneil, Contracts: Exchange Transactions and Relations (New York, 
NY: Foundation Press, 3rd edn, 2001) pt 2. 
37 I.R. Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neo-classical and Relational Contract Law’ (1978) 72 Northwestern 
University Law Review 854, 888. 
38 paras [95]-[99]. 
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granted, subject to YSL achieving ‘mutually agreed targets’.39 But although, for 
example, the precise quantities in Yam Seng could not be specified in advance, 
provision for this would have been a relatively simple matter had ITC not 
misrepresented its position and undertaken obligations it could not perform. 
Quantities of this sort have been fixed in a workable, if certainly ultimately 
unsatisfactory,40 fashion by the implication of ‘reasonable efforts’ clauses,41 for their 
parameters may be said to be assumed at the time of agreement, as, in essence, they 
were in Yam Seng.  
 But that the relational quality of the Yam Seng contract is not pronounced does 
not detract from, indeed it enhances, the real importance of Leggatt J’s identification 
of it as relational, which is that that it allows us to grasp the ‘relational’ quality of all 
contracts, and to this I now turn. 
 
GOOD FAITH AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTS 
Leggatt J begins his discussion of YSL’s pleading on good faith by quoting Professor 
McKendrick to describe in very familiar terms a ‘“traditional English hostility” 
towards a doctrine of good faith’, and by identifying three reasons for this hostility.42 
                                                                                                                                            
39 para [26]. 
40 Macneil thought the modern American law represented by R2d Contracts, which he 
called the ‘neo-classical’ law (ibid), was composed of such ad hoc responses to the 
failings of the classical law: Macneil, n 32 above. Williams v Roffey is of precisely 
this nature. 
41 I take this terminology from the judgment of Cardozo J in Wood v Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon 222 NY 88; 118 NE 214 (1917). The relational nature of the development of 
this device in the English law is acutely set out in J. Adams and R. Brownsword, Key 
Issues in Contract (London: Butterworths, 1995) 80-7.  
42 para [123], quoting E. McKendrick, Contract Law (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 9th edn, 2011) 221-2 (now 10th edn, 2013, 219). For McKendrick’s views 
on good faith see E. McKendrick, ‘Good Faith: A Matter of Principle?’ in A.D.M. 
Forte (ed), Good Faith in Contract and Property Law (Oxford: Hart, 1999). His views 
on Yam Seng are presented in ‘Good Faith in the Performance of a Contract’, in L. 
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In the order in which I will discuss these reasons they are: first, inconsistency with the 
parties’ self-interest; secondly, inconsistency with the English preference for 
piecemeal solutions; and thirdly, inconsistency with the English preference for 
contractual certainty. 
 
Inconsistency with the parties’ self-interest 
Leggatt J rightly observes that ‘English law is said to embody an ethos of 
individualism, whereby the parties are free to pursue their own self-interest not only 
in negotiating but also in performing contracts provided they do not act in breach of 
the terms of the contract’,43 and, citing the principal modern articulation of this belief, 
that of Lord Ackner in Walford v Miles,44 that a doctrine of good faith is widely 
believed to be inconsistent with this. There is, of course, a limit to how far Leggatt J 
can contradict views handed down in the House of Lords, and he purports to 
distinguish Yam Seng from Walford v Miles. But for the purposes of assessing the 
theoretical significance of his judgment it is best to just say that he shows Lord 
Ackner’s belief to be quite wrong. Leggatt J describes the actual position in a way 
which merits quotation in full: 
The modern case law on the construction of contracts has emphasised that 
contracts, like all human communications, are made against a background 
of unstated shared understandings which inform their meaning. The 
breadth of the relevant background and the fact that it has no conceptual 
limits have also been stressed … Importantly for present purposes, the 
relevant background against which contracts are made includes not only 
matters of fact known to the parties but also shared values and norms of 
behaviour. Some of these are norms that command general social 
acceptance; others may be specific to a particular trade or commercial 
activity; others may be more specific still, arising from features of the 
                                                                                                                                            
DiMatteo and M. Hogg (eds), Transatlantic Perspectives on Commercial Contract 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
43 para [123]. 
44 [1992] 2 AC 128 (HL) at 138E-G.  
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particular contractual relationship. Many such norms are naturally taken 
for granted by the parties when making any contract without being spelt 
out in the document recording their agreement. A paradigm example of a 
general norm which underlies almost all contractual relationships is an 
expectation of honesty. That expectation is essential to commerce, which 
depends critically upon trust … The central idea [behind fidelity to the 
parties’ bargain] is that contracts can never be complete in the sense of 
expressly providing for every event that may happen. To apply a contract 
to circumstances not specifically provided for, the language must 
accordingly be given a reasonable construction which promotes the values 
and purposes expressed or implicit in the contract.45 
 Leggatt J has here captured what Macneil fundamentally wanted to argue in the 
relational theory of contract: all contracts are relational in the sense that no contract is 
the product only of the agreement of the parties but rather is a fundamentally co-
operative exchange relationship, the essential nature of which is not traceable to the 
parties’ individual subjective wills. Contracting can take place only within a 
framework of implicit duties of respect for each party’s autonomy which 
institutionalises that co-operation. 
 The view of contracting stated by Lord Ackner is the (neo-classical economic 
and) classical legal view of contracting parties motivated by self-interest exercised 
within minimal legal bounds. This view is often criticised for denying the necessity of 
any legal regulation of economic action at all. But it is more accurate to say that its 
characteristic shortcoming is that it conceives of the role of the state in a crudely 
rudimentary fashion;46 the mere prevention of ‘force or fraud’ as Mill said of laissez 
faire.47 This barely begins to describe the range and complexity of the legal rules, 
principally of the common law of contract, necessary for agreement to take place. 
                                                                                                                                            
45 paras [133]-[135], [139]. 
46 D. Campbell and M. Klaes, ‘The Principle of Institutional Direction: Coase’s 
Regulatory Critique of Intervention’ (2005) 29 Cambridge Journal of Economics 263, 
278-9. 
47 J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, in J.S. Mill, Collected Works, vols 2-3 
(Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1965) 936. 
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 Elaborating on ‘the two traditional criteria used to identify terms implied in fact 
… that the term is so obvious that it goes without saying and that the term is 
necessary to give business efficacy to the contract’,48 Leggatt J identifies a number of 
duties which he thinks are implicit in ‘good faith’.49 These include ‘honesty’,50 
avoiding ‘commercial impropriety’, ‘unacceptability’ and ‘unconscionability’,51 
‘fidelity to the parties’ bargain’,52 ‘co-operation’, a duty not to frustrate ‘reasonable 
expectations’, a duty not to act ‘arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably’, a duty not 
‘unreasonably’ to withhold a contractually required consent, a duty to bring ‘an 
unusual or onerous’ term ‘fairly’ to the notice of the other party,53 and ‘fair dealing’.54 
Leaving aside interventionist statute, the (sometimes codified) common law of 
contract is a set of such duties, and when a purely self-interested party fails to respect 
them, the law of contract should not support its opportunistic attitude. 
 The law of contract establishes channels through which self-interest can 
legitimately be pursued through economic exchange. This channelling is poorly 
understood, but in economics it is widely referred to as the preservation of trust,55 
and, though it certainly remains the case that the classical law of contract gives only 
halting and incoherent doctrinal expression to it, it is legally institutionalised in, inter 
alia, the duties that Leggatt J sets out. The relational theory enjoys a coherence 
                                                                                                                                            
48 para [132]. 
49 paras [144], [150]. 
50 paras [135]-[137]. 
51 para [138]. 
52 para [139]. 
53 All para [145]. 
54 para [150]. 
55 D. Campbell, ‘The Relational Constitution of Contract and the Limits of 
“Economics:” Kenneth Arrow on the Social Background of Markets’, in S. Deakin 
and J. Michie (eds), Contracts, Co-operation and Competition: Studies in Economics, 
Management and Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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superior to the classical law because it has these duties at its core.56 But it is just this 
quality that seems to have inhibited the reception of that theory.57 Because it has 
focused on the norms essential to contract, the relational theory is generally regarded 
as paternalistic and opposed to freedom of contract, having little place for 
competition, and so of limited or no application.58 But this certainly was not 
Macneil’s intention,59 and the relational theory can readily be restated in such a way 
as to give competition a central place in it.60 
 It seems that Macneil made a serious mistake when initially setting out the 
relational theory. He then used ‘relational’ to describe both non-presentiated 
contracts, ie relational as opposed to discrete contracts; and also to describe the 
relational element of all contracts, including discrete contracts. He never properly 
came to terms with the complications caused by this unfortunate usage, though in later 
                                                                                                                                            
56 I.R. Macneil, ‘Values in Contract: Internal and External’ (1983) 78 Northwestern 
University Law Review 340. Macneil’s taxonomies of contractual norms, of which 
this was but the last full statement, are excessively detailed, and R. Austen-Baker, 
‘Comprehensive Contract Theory: A Four Norm Model of Contractual Relations’ 
(2009) 25 Journal of Contract Law 216 provides helpful suggestions for their 
simplification. 
57 Judging from the comment on Yam Seng by practising commercial lawyers which 
has so far appeared since this note was accepted for publication, this point will 
continue to do so despite the discussion of the relational contract the case has 
stimulated: H. Pugh, ‘An Implied Term of Good Faith: A Watershed or a Damp 
Squib’ (2013) 28 Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 
347, 348 col 3.  
58 eg G. Teubner, ‘Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law’ 
(2000) 9 Social and Legal Studies 399, 404-5. See in criticism D. Campbell, ‘The 
Limits of Concept Formation in Legal Science’ (2000) 9 Social and Legal Studies 
439, 445. 
59 D. Campbell, ‘Ian Macneil and the Relational Theory of Contract’ in Macneil, n 30 
above, 20-7. 
60 D. Campbell, ‘The Relational Constitution of the Discrete Contract’ in D. Campbell 
and P. Vincent-Jones (eds), Contract and Economic Organisation (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth Publishing, 1996); D. Campbell, ‘The Relational Constitution of Remedy: 
Co-operation as the Implicit Second Principle of Remedies for Breach of Contract’ 
(2005) 11 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 455 and D. Campbell, ‘A Relational Critique 
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work he did adopt the term ‘intertwined’ to describe what I think it more natural to 
call ‘complex’ contracts, leaving the term relational to do the fundamental work of 
describing the relational quality of all contracts.61 This terminological clarification, 
distinguishing the complex quality of some contracts from the relational quality of all 
contracts, allows us to grasp an unappreciated aspect of the relational theory’s 
conception of the intentions of the parties which it is a great virtue of Leggatt J’s 
judgment to have effectively sought to express; the intrinsic morality of the objective 
conception of intention. 
 
Good faith, objectivity and the contractual relation 
Leggatt J’s conception of good faith seems to be heavily indebted to Lord Steyn’s 
article on reasonable expectations which I have mentioned, which is cited.62 In 
particular, both Lord Steyn and he claim that it is the objectivity of the contractually 
recognised intentions of the parties that principally inserts good faith (and reasonable 
expectations) into the interpretation of those intentions: 
[T]he test of good faith is objective in the sense that it depends not on 
either party’s perception of whether particular conduct is improper but on 
whether in the particular context the conduct would be regarded as 
commercially unacceptable by reasonable and honest people … This 
follows from the fact that the content of the duty of good faith is 
established by a process of construction which in English law is based on 
                                                                                                                                            
of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution § 39’ (2011) 68 Washington and Lee Law 
Review 1063. 
61 I.R. Macneil, ‘Relational Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors 
Lindenberg and de Vos’ (1987) 143 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics 272, 276. Macneil’s principal statements of the relational theory after the 
changes he made to it are I.R. Macneil, ‘Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and 
Queries’ (2000) 94 Northwestern University Law Review 877 and I.R. Macneil, 
‘Reflections on Relational Contract Theory after a Neo-classical Seminar’ in D. 
Campbell et al (eds), Implicit Dimensions of Contract (Oxford: Hart, 2003). 
62 para [145]. One of Lord Steyn’s important judgments turning on reasonable 
expectations is also mentioned: First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian International 
Bank Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194 (CA). 
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an objective principle. The court is concerned not with the subjective 
intentions of the parties but with their presumed intention, which is 
ascertained by attributing to them the purposes and values which 
reasonable people in their situation would have had … Understood in the 
way I have described … an implied duty of good faith … is consistent 
with the theme identified by Lord Steyn as running through our law of 
contract that reasonable expectations must be protected … such a concept 
is, I believe, already reflected in several lines of authority that are well 
established.63 
 Good faith is part of the objective intentions of the parties because, as we have 
seen, legitimate contracts never allow of untrammelled self-interest. Contracts are 
never the result of the agreement of two parties but are always the result of that 
agreement mediated by the state, which authoritatively interprets the agreement 
according to the understandings of a reasonable third party. It is not merely that it is 
impossible for parties to reveal their purely subjective intentions when contracting, 
though this is the case.64 It is that an attempt to do so is irrelevant.65 To constitute a 
contract, subjective intentions must, as a moral duty, be expressed in the objective 
form recognised as legitimate by the state, and contracting parties must negotiate 
accordingly if they wish to get what they want from the contract. 
 The essence of that objective form is that only one type of inducement to enter 
into an agreement is legitimate: persuasion of the other party, whose autonomy has to 
be respected, by showing that the agreement is a bargain which is in that party’s own 
                                                                                                                                            
63 paras [144]- [145]. 
64 D. Campbell, ‘The Relational Constitution of Contractual Agreement’ in P. 
Heugens et al (eds), The Social Institutions of Capitalism (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2003) and D. Campbell and H. Collins, ‘Discovering the Implicit Dimensions 
of Contracts’ in Campbell et al (eds), n 61 above. 
65 H. Collins, ‘Objectivity and Committed Contextualism in Interpretation’ in S. 




interest.66 This can never be done by fraud, sharp dealing, or failure to satisfy myriad 
inevitably unstated reasonable expectations about the nature of the performances to be 
exchanged. To legitimately pursue its own self-interest, a party must secure the 
voluntary co-operation, in the form appropriate to the particular contract, of the other 
party. The fundamental unit for the analysis of contract therefore is not the subjective 
will of the contracting party, but the subjective will in the objective form of the 
persuasion of the other party; that is to say, in a form constitutive of the contractual 
relation of co-operation. 
 The lingering presence of the classical law in cases like Walford v Miles attests 
to a continuing failure to acknowledge the relational nature of contract.67 As the 
classical law understands the legal framework necessary for exchange only as a set of 
limits which contract imposes on otherwise untrammelled self-interest, this 
framework seems to be opposed to freedom of contract. But it should be understood 
as the creation of the possibility of that freedom, for that possibility does not inhere in 
the subjective self-interested will but in that will in the form of the objective relation 
of co-operation. Parties cannot make contracts if they are really purely self-interested. 
Their self-interest must be channelled if contracting is to be possible at all.  
 In a most penetrative passage, Leggatt J tells us that: 
as the basis of the duty of good faith is the presumed intention of the 
parties and meaning of their contract, its recognition is not an illegitimate 
restriction on the freedom of the parties to pursue their own interests. The 
essence of contracting is that the parties bind themselves in order to co-
operate to their mutual benefit. The obligations which they undertake 
                                                                                                                                            
66 D. Campbell and J. Loughrey, ‘The Regulation of Self-interest in Financial 
Markets’, in J O’Brien and G Gilligan, eds, Integrity, Risk and Accountability in 
Capital Markets: Regulating Culture (Oxford: Hart, 2013) 84-9. 
67 After this note was accepted for publication, a renewed defence of Walford v Miles 
on basically classical, and therefore in my opinion ultimately unavailing, lines 
appeared: H. Hoskins, ‘Contractual Obligations to Negotiate in Good Faith: 
Faithfulness to the Agreed Common Purpose’ (2014) 130 Law Quarterly Review 131. 
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include those which are implicit in their agreement as well as those which 
they have made explicit.68 
Though not entirely without precedent, this passage represents an important stage in 
the emergence within the English law of the realisation that contract is a system of co-
operation which Macneil has urged upon us: 
We … think of economic exchange as being extremely individualistic and 
selfish, rather than co-operative [but it] is the fact that exchange represents 
a species of human co-operation … exchange involves a mutual goal of 
the parties, namely the reciprocal transfer of values. And this is true 
however strongly the ‘economic man’ - the ‘as-much-as-possible-for-as-
little-as-possible-in-return-man’ - may dominate the motivations of both 
parties to an exchange.69 
Macneil has also told us that remedying our lack of understanding of contractual co-
operation was necessary for us properly to explain the puzzling ubiquity of the 
‘limits’ on what was supposed to be a system of self-interest. These limits: 
appear as exceptions to some general rule permitting the parties fully to 
define their legal status [but] if the role of the law in creating contracts 
were more completely presented this distortion would not occur, and these 
matters would be seen not as exceptions to freedom of contract but as 
simply part of the law’s definition of contract.70 
Macneil made this observation more than 50 years ago.71 
 
Inconsistency with the English preference for piecemeal solutions  
On the basis of his identification of a considerable number of specific duties linked to 
good faith already recognised in the English law, Leggatt J suggests that ‘the 
traditional English hostility to a doctrine of good faith … to the extent it still persists, 
                                                                                                                                            
68 para [148]. 
69 I.R. Macneil, ‘Whither Contracts?’ (1969) 21 Journal of Legal Education 403, 405. 
70 I.R. Macneil, ‘Review of H. Shepherd and B.D. Sher, Law in Society: An 
Introduction to Freedom of Contract’ (1960) 46 Cornell Law Quarterly 176, 177. 
71 Over the last twenty years I have myself applied Macneil’s thinking to the analysis 
of the relational nature of objectivity and the relational duties implicit in agreement: 
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is misplaced’.72 Two distinct points should be distinguished here. First, to repeat, 
English law, despite so much that is said, has a doctrine of good faith, and there is no 
point arguing about it because it is analytically essential to the concept of a 
voluntarily agreed bargain.73 But, secondly, the English doctrine is not a general 
doctrine of good faith but a doctrine made up of numerous specific duties. What is 
missing from the current English law is a clear understanding of what the law actually 
is, for our understanding of agreement remains dominated by the inadequate 
conceptions of self-interest in the classical law expressed by Lord Ackner. But as 
Leggatt J is aware that ‘there is nothing novel or foreign to English law in recognising 
an implied duty of good faith’,74 he can say that: 
there seems to me to be no difficulty, following the established 
methodology of English law for the implication of terms in fact, in 
implying … a duty [of good faith] in any ordinary commercial contract 
based on the presumed intention of the parties.75  
 The English law does not, then, have to decide whether to have a doctrine of 
good faith; it has to decide how to have one. In his outstanding 1956 paper, Powell 
argued that adoption of a general doctrine of good faith would allow the English 
courts ‘to give effect to their sense of the justice of the case’ without having ‘to resort 
to contortions or subterfuges’.76 Leggatt J’s judgment is, in effect, an argument that 
this is not, or is no longer, necessary. Restating in his own terms the influential dicta 
                                                                                                                                            
Campbell, n 64 above, and Campbell, ‘The Relational Constitution of the Discrete 
Contract’, n 60 above. 
72 para [153]. 
73 After this note was accepted for publication, Mr Bogle pointed out that Yam Seng 
represents the extension to England and Wales of Professor MacQueen’s argument 
about the ‘undisclosed principle’ of good faith in Scotland: S Bogle, ‘Disclosing 
Good Faith in English Contract Law’ (2014) 18 Edinburgh Law Review 141, 144-145.  
74 para [145]. 
75 para [131]. 
76 R. Powell, ‘Good Faith in Contracts’ [1956] Current Legal Problems 16, 26. 
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of Bingham LJ in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd,77 
which he quotes,78 Leggatt J tells us that:  
because the content of the duty [of good faith] is heavily dependent on 
context and is established through a process of construction of the 
contract, its recognition is entirely consistent with the case by case 
approach favoured by the common law. There is therefore no need for 
common lawyers to abandon their characteristic methods and adopt those 
of civil law systems in order to accommodate the principle.79  
 Current debate would be vastly improved if it were understood that allowing 
that the English law recognises good faith does not logically entail that it has to have a 
general doctrine, or principle, of good faith. The issue is one of determining the best 
legal institutionalisation of the doctrine, which is, in the first instance, but only in the 
first instance, a matter of the formulation of legal doctrine. Having seen what has 
happened to the law of negligence since Donoghue v Stevenson, I am surprised that 
anyone committed to the core value of the market institutionalised in contract, 
freedom of choice, which requires that the terms of an exchange should be 
endogenously determined by the parties to it, can welcome a general doctrine of good 
faith. It seems to me that, of its nature, such a doctrine invites exogenous 
determination of terms by the courts in just the way that the law of negligence now 
completely rests on expansive judicial policy-making. Lord Atkin was no doubt right 
to say that each of the traditional categories of negligence expressed the existence of a 
duty of care. But this does not entail that it is necessary to determine the reach of that 
duty by argument from the neighbour ‘principle’,80 and the increasingly deplorable 
consequences of this petitio principii have, of course, been enormous. 
                                                                                                                                            
77 [1989] 1 QB 433 (CA) at 439D-F. 
78 para [121]. 
79 para [147]. 
80 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL) at 579-80. The late Professor Birks’ 




Inconsistency with the English preference for certainty 
Though how Yam Seng deals with this point will substantially determine whether its 
reception is positive or otherwise,81 Leggatt J gives but short shrift to ‘the fear that 
recognising a duty of good faith would generate excessive uncertainty’ because, as 
‘there is nothing unduly vague or unworkable about the concept[, its] application 
involves no more uncertainty than is inherent in the process of contractual 
interpretation’.82 If we accept Leggatt J’s insertion of good faith into objective 
intentions, then this claim is, it is submitted, essentially sound. When ‘the basis of the 
duty of good faith is the presumed intention of the parties and [the] meaning of their 
contract’,83 then such insertion ‘does not involve the court in imposing its view of 
what is substantively fair on the parties’.84 Good faith poses no particular 
interpretative problem, and indeed one could say that all interpretative problems will 
be problems of the interpretation of good faith in the particular case.85 But to say this 
is by no means to claim that Yam Seng itself resolves the problem of uncertainty in the 
application of good faith.  
 YSL sought to give ‘relevant content’ to its pleading of breach of the duty of 
good faith by claiming that, in the circumstances of the case, that duty resolved into 
                                                                                                                                            
that the identification of ‘generic conceptions’ entailed precisely this: P. Birks, An 
Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, rev edn, 1989) 17. 
81 A comment on the case which appeared after this note was accepted for publication 
makes this clear: S. Whittaker, ‘Good Faith, Implied Terms and Commercial 
Contracts’ (2013) 129 Law Quarterly Review 463. 
82 para [152]. 
83 para [148]. 
84 para [150]. 
85 Further development of this line of argument has to be conducted in light of the 
difficulties of Lord Hoffmann’s treatment of implied terms in AG of Belize v Belize 
Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10, [2009] 1 WLR 1988. 
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two specific implied duties.86 The most important of these for our purposes was ‘a 
duty not to give false information’, which Leggatt J agreed could be derived from the 
wider implied duties, particularly ‘the core expectation of honesty’,87 and, indeed, he 
described this specific obligation as ‘the implied duty of honesty in the provision of 
information’.88 
 But there are two senses in which ITC could have had a duty not to give false 
information. One is the general prohibition of fraud which Leggatt J thought part of 
the duty of honesty implicit in all contracts. However, we have seen that Leggatt J did 
not maintain that Mr Presswell was dishonest in the sense that he had an intention to 
deceive. But not condemning Mr Presswell as dishonest in this way gives rise to a 
serious difficulty. 
 For the second sense in which ITC could have had a duty not to give false 
information is that it had a contractual duty to give correct information which it 
breached. Now, this was the case, and it is the main point Leggatt J tried to establish. 
But such a duty cannot be (entirely) traced to the duty of honesty implicit in all 
contracts because it is only in a small sub-set of contracts that the defendant has an 
obligation of this sort to give information. Of course, any information the defendant 
may choose to give cannot be false,89 and Mr Presswell certainly did, right from the 
outset, give false information in this sense, entirely justifying ITC’s being found liable 
for misrepresentation. But this is not enough to be able to say that ITC had a 
contractual duty to give correct information. In order to maintain that ITC had and 
breached such a duty, Leggatt J is obliged to say, quite inconsistently with his general 
                                                                                                                                            
86 paras [154]-[164]. 
87 para [156]. 
88 para [165]. 
89 para [141]. 
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opinion of Mr Presswell’s state of mind, that Mr Presswell was ‘objectively … 
dishonest’ when he gave false information.90 
 But it is, with the greatest respect, difficult to understand what is meant by 
objective dishonesty, which seems to be the dishonesty of one who has not been 
proven to be dishonest.91 This may be enough for the mess that is the current law of 
misrepresentation, but it is not enough for an innovative attempt to base liability on a 
coherent handling of the implied contractual duties. The problem, of course, is that, 
even as Leggatt J has it, good faith is doing far too much work. He is right to conclude 
that Yam Seng was a case in which ‘the requirements of honesty go further’ than ‘the 
core value of honesty’.92 But, as with Lord Steyn celebrating the rights of the matter 
prevailing over ‘technical and conceptualistic reasoning’ in Williams v Roffey, Leggatt 
J is unable to tell us why it is right to go further in this particular case, but not in most 
others. As he is unable to identify precisely why the contract justifies finding an 
obligation to provide information, for the breach of which the defendant is strictly 
liable, even Leggatt J’s conclusions have the air of an imposition of good faith as a 
moral standard not derived from the intentions of the parties.93 
 In the end, Leggatt J has to descend to using the tired device of the collateral 
warranty to underpin his decision about ITC’s contractual liability for failure to 
supply merchandise as required. His claim that ‘a reasonable person would have 
understood the parties to have intended’ to use this unnatural legal fiction somewhat 
                                                                                                                                            
90 para [171]. 
91 This concept of objective dishonesty seems to be derived from the questionable 
criminal law case of R v Ghosh [1982] EWCA Crim 2, [1982] QB 1053. 
92 para [141]. 
93 One therefore cannot but suspect that, had the judgment not, in the end, established 
ITC’s relevant duties by very detailed analysis of its specific obligations but had 
merely been based on what is said of good faith, then appeal over liability in contract, 
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defeats the purpose of his entire judgment.94 Leggatt J is driven to rely on some magic 
in the word ‘collateral’ because he cannot explain why duties which ‘go further’ in 
this case should be recognised. Evidently it is not enough, though it is a very great 
deal, to say that Yam Seng involved a relational contract. This must be tied to an 
understanding of presentiation, and of relational obligations as responses to 
presentiation’s limits, if, as is Leggatt J’s clear intention, we are to dispel the fear that 
the use of good faith he envisages invites uncertainty in the sense of interpretation 
which imposes exogenous standards. 
 Though the very completeness of Leggatt J’s review of all the terms invoking 
good faith to some extent inevitably invites this, I fear something has gone wrong 
when that review yields such an overwhelming pleonasm of (near) synonyms of good 
faith. And someone like myself who used to be very preoccupied with modern social 
theory can readily recognise what it is. Pleonasm is substituting for lack of 
comprehension. Leggatt J emphatically shows that untrammelled self-interest is not 
and cannot be the basis of the English law of contract, but, in the absence of an 
adequate understanding of presentiation and its limitations, he cannot entirely 
satisfactorily handle the difference between relational as opposed to discrete 
contracts. The result in Yam Seng is an ultimately unanchored set of duties which 
invites the uncertainty which it is Leggatt J’s wish to avoid. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE VALUES OF GOOD FAITH 
Like, I fear, the overwhelming majority of English lawyers and academics now 
obligated to form an opinion on such matters, I do not enjoy ‘any great familiarity’ 
                                                                                                                                            
if not in misrepresentation, might, even in this case, in which the defendant’s position 
had very little merit, have been invited. 
26 
 
with the way good faith works in continental systems,95 and such knowledge as I do 
have is entirely founded on accounts in English of that working.96 I can merely say 
that, despite long being convinced that the ‘traditional English hostility’ certainly is 
‘misplaced’, it seems to me that a doctrine of good faith articulated through specific 
duties will be far more likely to respect the intentions of the parties than a general 
doctrine. But, despite the type of approach Leggatt J shows to be possible, nothing 
really can be done to base a law of good faith on those intentions if the prevailing 
attitude towards interpretation is one of sympathy towards welfarist improvements 
upon them. And as much current appeal court law and much scholarship is of this 
nature, advocacy of a general duty is largely driven by a broad sympathy with the 
substitution of exogenous standards for the intentions of the parties. 
 Leggatt J situates his views against ‘[t]he modern case law on the construction 
of contracts’ exemplified by ‘the famous speech of Lord Hoffmann in Investors 
                                                                                                                                            
94 para [98]. 
95 Steyn, n 27 above, 438. 
96 A law of which I can claim a detailed knowledge, the US law of contract, is used by 
Leggatt J (para [125]), as it was by Lord Steyn, n 27 above, 438, as a positive 
example of the adoption of good faith in a common law jurisdiction. Without 
argument and with the greatest respect, I will say that this is not an entirely happy 
example. On the principal problem raised by Yam Seng see V.P. Goldberg, 
‘Discretion in Long-term Open Quantity Contracts: Reining in Good Faith’ (2002) 35 
University of California Davis Law Review 319. In a paper which he has been good 
enough to show me in draft, Professor Feinman has tried to restate the US doctrine of 
good faith in a way which avoids many of its acknowledged problems by taking 
essentially the line I here argue is taken by Leggatt J: J.M. Feinman, ‘Good Faith and 
Reasonable Expectations’ 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2245144 
 Two books published last year most interestingly present to a UK readership the 
‘new formalism’ that, one step ahead of the new contextualism, has been the most 
interesting line of development of recent US contract theory: C. Mitchell, Contract 
Law and Contract Practice (Oxford: Hart, 2013) and J. Morgan, Contract Law 
Minimalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society’.97 What is typically 
ignored in the effulgent encomia to what effectively is a lecture on interpretation 
given in this speech is that the actual interpretation Lord Hoffmann placed on the 
vexed term of the contract is unarguably highly contentious and, in my opinion, 
preposterous.98 This speech has been so well received only because its solicitude for 
the ‘purpose’ of the contract had the effect of keeping afloat, in respect of a certain 
group of investors, a no doubt well intended but ‘needlessly confusing and obscure’ 
government scheme that was drafted in so ‘slovenly’ a manner as to prejudice those 
investors’ interests.99 The warning sounded in Investors, that ‘[p]urposive 
interpretation’ ‘must not be allowed to shade into’ ‘creative interpretation’,100 was 
most unfortunately ignored, in deed if not in some words, in the very case which has 
established the ‘new contextualist’ atmosphere for the ‘modern case law’ of 
interpretation. 
 To some extent, the result in Investors is a contractual example of the 
characteristic welfarist extension of latitude to the ‘public’ as opposed to the ‘private’. 
But the essential concern with a purpose which the court itself must supply because, 
ex hypothesi, in cases like Investors the favoured party has failed to identify it to the 
contract, evidences the willingness to apply even to commercial cases exogenous 
                                                                                                                                            
97 para [135], citing [1998] 1 WLR 896 (HL) at 906H-918D. Leggatt J also mentions 
Lord Hoffmann’s subsequent dicta in BCCI v Ali [2001] UKHL 8, [2002] 1 AC 251 at 
para [39]. 
98 The powerful dissent by Lord Lloyd (Investors, n 97 above, 899-906H) affirmed 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal ([1998] 1 BCLC 521 (CA)), which, in my 
opinion, clearly identified the confusion on which the Chancery judgment turned: 
[1998] 1 BCLC 493 (Ch D).  
99 Investors, n 97 above, 899B per Lord Lloyd. 
100 ibid, at 904D. 
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standards characteristic of a general duty of good faith.101 It is in this connection that I 
have claimed that determining a correct policy towards good faith is only in the first 
instance a question of legal doctrine. Ultimately it is a question of values. The growth 
of welfarism may be described as an attack on the values that lie behind sanctity of 
contract.102 There are, of course, good reasons for this attack, which is why it is being 
led by some of our best judges and commentators. The capacity to utilise the law to 
one’s advantage in terms of turning one’s subjective will into an objectively binding 
promise from another is itself a scarce and unequally distributed personal and social 
resource, and unequal distribution of a social resource rightly gives rise to a 
presumption of injustice. Courts are continually faced with a choice between giving 
effect to the objectively expressed intentions of the parties, or trying to produce a 
better outcome than this by giving effect to what they believe one of the parties really 
subjectively meant, although that party has failed to give that meaning an adequate 
objective statement. This is an essentially contested choice because the values which 
underpin both alternatives all have their attractions.103 And, as Professor Macaulay 
                                                                                                                                            
101 Mitchell, n 96 above, 6 says of the Supreme Court’s injunction ‘to uphold 
commercial purposes and pursue commercially reasonable outcomes over absurd ones 
when interpreting commercial agreements’ in Rainy Sky CA and others v Kookmin 
Bank [2011] UKSC 50; [2011] 1 WLR 2900 that ‘it is not clear whether [this] appeal 
to commercial considerations … entails a set of determinate and readily identifiable 
values that can genuinely inform legal reasoning or is just a rhetorical gloss to obscure 
an exercise of judicial discretion’.  
102 With regard to our specific concerns here see J.H. Baker, ‘From Sanctity of 
Contract to Reasonable Expectations’ (1979) 32 Current Legal Problems 17.  
103 The consequent tension is nowhere more interestingly exhibited than in Professor 
Brownword’s leading analysis of good faith: R. Brownsword, ‘General 
Considerations’ in M.P. Furmston (ed), The Law of Contract (London: Butterworths, 
4th edn, 2010) paras 1.79-1.103. This comprehensive statement contains references to 
Brownsword’s earlier work on the subject.  
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has acutely put it, adjudication and policy-making in contract turns on the ‘problem of 
proportioning’ these values.104 
 I believe that, in an appropriately delimited but nevertheless as large as possible 
market sphere, freedom of contract should be the paramount – it cannot be the sole - 
value which should guide us when taking a position on this issue, but that the balance 
struck in recent leading judgments is generally far too welfarist. However this is, in 
any particular case determining Macaulay’s proportion depends on identifying the 
nature of the particular contract. Is it a largely presentiated, discrete contract in which 
the parties should be left, so far as is possible given what we have seen of the illusory 
nature of pure self-interest, to their own efforts to give objective expression to their 
subjective will, and to rightly suffer the consequences of the shortcomings of those 
efforts? Or is it a minimally presentiated, relational contract in which the parties 
could, to varying degrees, reasonably rely on the active assistance of each other to 
realise their intentions, and can count on the court to endorse such reliance, even 
when it takes the form of radical modification? 
 When making our minds up about this, we must recall that the fact that all 
contracts are relational in the general sense we have discussed does not mean they all 
have the dominant quality of being relational in the restricted sense. A contract may 
be relational in the first sense but still involve highly competitive negotiating stances; 
or, to put it the other way around, a highly competitive contract is possible only when 
the parties acknowledge the mutual moral duties of their fundamentally co-operative 
relationship. Leggatt J’s intrinsically moral but flexible conception of good faith is an 
                                                                                                                                            
104 S. Macaulay, ‘Justice Trayner and the Law of Contracts’ (1961) 13 Stanford Law 
Review 812, 813. 
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important and very welcome development of the English law’s capacity to come to 
terms with this. 
